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A B S T R A C T
It is increasingly clear that averting ecological breakdown will require drastic changes to contemporary human
society and the global economy embedded within it. On the other hand, the basic material needs of billions of
people across the planet remain unmet. Here, we develop a simple, bottom-up model to estimate a practical
minimal threshold for the final energy consumption required to provide decent material livings to the entire
global population. We find that global final energy consumption in 2050 could be reduced to the levels of the
1960s, despite a population three times larger. However, such a world requires a massive rollout of advanced
technologies across all sectors, as well as radical demand-side changes to reduce consumption – regardless of
income – to levels of sufficiency. Sufficiency is, however, far more materially generous in our model than what
those opposed to strong reductions in consumption often assume.
1. Introduction
The annual energy use of late-Palaeolithic foragers is estimated to
have been around 5 GJ per person annually (Smil, 2017) – the sum of
food-energy metabolised plus biomass for cooking. By 1850, after
nearly 10,000 years of agriculturally-supported expansion, average
global primary energy consumption rose to over 20 GJ/cap (GEA,
2012). Today, after 150 years of fossil-fuelled industrial development, it
has reached 80 GJ/cap (IEA, 2019a). In absolute terms, total global
primary energy use has risen from around 1 PJ in the late-Palaeolithic
to nearly 600,000 PJ today, driving changes in the composition of the
atmosphere (warming) and oceans (acidification) leading to dangerous
climate change (IPCC, 2018).
Have the massive increases in energy consumption that accom-
panied the agricultural and industrial revolutions brought about com-
parable improvements for human well-being? Evidence suggests that
for much of the past 10,000 years agriculture led to a declining quality
of life for most human populations, compared to their forager pre-
decessors (Larsen, 2006). But recent centuries have seen a rapid re-
versal of this trend, with improvements in health indicators across the
board. However, it is difficult to say whether humans today are better
off than ancient foragers (Diamond, 2010), who were far more socially
and politically sophisticated than is often assumed (Wengrow and
Graeber, 2015). Available data – life expectancy, child mortality, rates
of violence seen in some modern foraging societies – can never tell the
full story (Harari, 2016).
Regarding the modern era, however, some things can be stated with
certainty:
First, current levels of energy use underpin numerous existential
threats – ecological crises (Haberl et al., 2011; Steffen et al., 2015),
resource scarcity, and the geopolitical instabilities these issues can
catalyse, especially in a growth-dependent global economy (Büchs and
Koch, 2019). And those most severely impacted tend to be the least well
off (Haberl et al., 2011).
Second, while immense improvements in energy efficiency have
occurred throughout the industrial revolution, these largely served to
boost productivity and enable further growth (Brockway et al., 2017;
Sakai et al., 2018; Ayres and Warr, 2010). Global energy use has thus
risen consistently (GEA, 2012), with the exception of financial crises –
whose effects soon wear off (Geels, 2013) – and global pandemics (Le
Quéré et al., 2020) – the long-term impacts of which are yet to be seen.
In countries where economic activity appears to have been decoupled
from energy-use, this normally turns out to be an artefact of accounting
conventions (Arto et al., 2016; Haberl et al., 2020) – namely, produc-
tion-based methods, which ignore offshoring of production and im-
ported goods (Peters, 2008; Peters et al., 2011).
Finally, the drastic increases in societies’ energy use seen in recent
decades have, beyond a certain point, had no benefit for the well-being
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of their populations – social returns on energy consumption per capita
become increasingly marginal (Arto et al., 2016; Steinberger and
Roberts, 2010; Steinberger et al., 2012; Martínez and Ebenhack, 2008).
Some countries thus achieve high social outcomes with far lower energy
consumption than others, but none currently manage to achieve high
social outcomes while staying within planetary boundaries (O’Neill
et al., 2018).
Estimating the energy requirements of well-being is therefore an
important but challenging task. Fortunately, recent advances have been
made in both theory (Rao and Baer, 2012; Day et al., 2016; Brand-
Correa and Steinberger, 2017) and estimation (Rao et al., 2019; Arto
et al., 2016). It has been argued that a finite and universal set of satiable
human needs underpin life satisfaction (O’Neill et al., 2018), while the
ways they can be satisfied are culturally, historically and technologi-
cally varied (Gough, 2015; Brand-Correa et al., 2018). Further, while
efficiency improvements have undoubtedly contributed to the de-
creasing levels of energy associated with human development
(Steinberger and Roberts, 2010), other cultural and technological (long-
and short-term) trends work counter to this. For example, diffuse con-
temporary social networks and a globalised economy necessitate high
levels of mobility and complex communications technologies to meet
basic needs of social and political participation, while infrastructure
biased toward private vehicles ensures much of this mobility is car-
dependent. A global population in the billions necessitates substantial
agricultural activity – the foraging methods of our ancestors were much
less energy intense, but could support< 1% of the current world po-
pulation (Burger and Fristoe, 2018). Moreover, inequality, and espe-
cially affluence, are now widely recognised as core drivers of environ-
mental damage (Wiedmann et al., 2020).
Here, we aim to contribute to these debates by estimating minimum
final energy requirements for decent living standards to be provided to
the entire global population in 2050. We build an energy-model upon
the existing framework of Rao and Min (2018a), which proposes a list
of basic material needs that underpin human well-being, and consider
final (as opposed to primary) energy in order to move a step closer to
the energy requirements of social life. These material needs are in many
ways specific to our time, but can be taken as a reasonable basis for the
coming decades. We find that, with a combination of the most efficient
technologies available and radical demand-side transformations that
reduce excess consumption to sufficiency-levels, the final energy re-
quirements for providing decent living standards to the global popu-
lation in 2050 could be over 60% lower than consumption today. In
countries that are today’s highest per-capita consumers, cuts of ~95%
appear possible while still providing decent living standards to all.
2. Background and theory
2.1. Two perspectives on human well-being and basic needs
What do we mean by decent living, and what is its relationship to
well-being? Debates about the good life can be traced back millennia to
Aristotelian and Buddhist ideas (Gough, 2015) and likely extend back
into unwritten (pre)history. The topic is thus vast, but in ecological
contexts debates have largely revolved around two types of well-being:
hedonic and eudaimonic (Lamb and Steinberger, 2017; Brand-Correa and
Steinberger, 2017; Gough, 2015; O'Neill, 2008).
The former has roots in Bentham’s utilitarianism and Epicurean
philosophy, and tends towards questions of happiness and subjective
well-being; calculus of pleasure and pain (O'Neill, 2008). There has
been a tendency within economics for such ideas to be simplified into
the notion that more is better, and that individuals can rationally judge
what to consume to improve their lives (Gough, 2015). In short, an
assumption that rising incomes can consistently raise well-being (Max-
Neef, 1995; Easterlin, 2017). Others have used the same ideas to
highlight the hedonic-treadmill of consumption, where people con-
stantly adapt to improved material circumstances, so that well-being
stagnates despite increasing wealth. From this perspective, true hap-
piness can only be obtained by turning away from the world of posi-
tional consumption and insatiable desires (O'Neill, 2008; Jackson,
2005). This ‘adaptivity’ has also been criticised for its contrary effects:
when people adapt to difficult circumstances this can leave subjective
well-being measures obscuring systemic injustices (Lamb and
Steinberger, 2017). Nonetheless, such adaptivity is a highly desirable
characteristic, given how much of the external circumstances of hu-
mans’ lives are beyond their control, and how fleeting desires can be –
things the Buddha taught millennia ago.
Despite the human capacity to adapt to unfortunate circumstances,
few argue against the idea that society should be structured such that
basic human needs are universally met so far as possible. This is where
eudaimonic conceptions of well-being enter, which underpin prominent
capabilities- and needs-based-approaches (Fanning and O'neill, 2019;
O'Neill, 2008). Broadly, these focus on providing people with the cap-
abilities required for flourishing – physical health and safety; clean air
and water and adequate nutrition; social and political participation;
autonomy (so far as it’s possible; Greene and Cohen, 2004) cultivated
through education and cognitive understanding; time and space for
imagination and social play (Lamb and Steinberger, 2017; Gough,
2015). The argument that such basic needs are universal and in-
dependent of cultural context, rests on the distinction between needs
and need satisfiers. Needs are universal; satisfiers culturally specific
(Doyal and Gough, 1991).
Needs-based approaches along these lines have recently been used
as a basis for developing a framework to decouple energy-use from
human well-being (Brand-Correa and Steinberger, 2017). But for
modelling purposes, these basic human needs must be translated to
material requirements. Recently, Rao and Min (2018a) have stepped in
to fill this gap by offering an inventory of universal material require-
ments they suggest are prerequisites for fulfilling basic human needs. In
compiling the inventory, they proposed that each material need should
(a) satisfy at least one basic need, (b) not impede others’ fulfilling their
needs and (c) either be the only satisfier of a particular need, or cur-
rently be overwhelmingly preferred by people (globally) among com-
peting satisfiers. They are clear to stress that fulfilment of these mate-
rial requirements are instrumental to achieving social and physical
well-being, but are by no means sufficient alone. Their inventory is shown
in Table 1, along with an indication of all regional variations that we
apply in the model (described in Section 3).
Our contribution is conceptually simple: We aim to estimate the
final energy needed to provide these material living standards to the full
global population. In this process, our intention is to imagine a world
that is fundamentally transformed, where state-of-the-art technologies
merge with drastic changes in demand to bring energy (and material)
consumption as low as possible, while providing decent material con-
ditions and basic services for all. To this end, we take a bottom-up
modelling approach.
2.2. Two approaches for estimating minimum energy-use requirements
Modelling attempts to estimate the energy requirements of meeting
basic human needs and enabling a high quality of life, tend to take
either a top-down or bottom-up approach.
Top-down approaches statistically analyse empirical data to in-
vestigate relationships between environmental impacts and social out-
comes. Among the former are energy consumption, ecological- or
carbon-footprints (Wackernagel and Rees, 1998), and among the latter
life expectancy (Dietz et al., 2012; Jorgenson and Dietz, 2015; Givens,
2018), life satisfaction (Knight and Rosa, 2011), composite indicators
such as the Human Development Index (HDI) (Martínez and Ebenhack,
2008; Steinberger and Roberts, 2010), and baskets of indicators often
inspired by the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (Lamb, 2016; Lamb
and Rao, 2015; O’Neill et al., 2018).
Previous estimates of the energy consumption necessary to achieve,
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for example, a high HDI are wide-ranging – a HDI above 0.8 appears to
require 30 to 100 + GJ/cap/yr in primary energy terms (Martínez and
Ebenhack, 2008; Steinberger and Roberts, 2010; Smil, 2005; Rao et al.,
2019). This range is unsurprising given the diversity of cultural, poli-
tical, technological and climatic factors at play, however, useful points
can still be made: Improvements in social outcomes with rising energy
consumption become increasingly marginal, saturating above 100–150
GJ/capita/yr of primary energy (Arto et al., 2016); countries tend to
achieve high social outcomes with lower energy use over time
(Steinberger and Roberts, 2010; Jorgenson et al., 2014); the energy-
consumption of countries with high social outcomes appears higher
when a consumption-based perspective is taken, due to offshoring of
high-energy industries (Arto et al., 2016); the levels of democracy
present appear to have negligible effect on the energy-intensity of well-
being (Mayer, 2017).
Studies exploring the ecological-intensity of well-being via other
means – e.g. by relating greenhouse gas emissions or ecological foot-
print to well-being – offer both consistent and additional findings.
Again, the ecological-intensity of well-being appears to be falling over
time (Jorgenson, 2014), but it’s higher for higher incomes (Jorgenson
and Dietz, 2015; Jorgenson and Givens, 2015). Further, the relationship
between inequality and carbon emissions is complex. Some suggest that
inequality increases the carbon-intensity of well-being (Jorgenson,
2015), particularly inequalities between countries (Rao and Min,
2018b). Others suggest that reducing inequality within countries is
likely to increase total carbon footprints in low-middle income countries
(Grunewald et al., 2017); the opposite relationship may exist in high-
income countries (Hubacek et al., 2017), but this is not yet well un-
derstood. Finally, although many countries provide good basic services
(e.g. widespread sanitation services) and achieve some social outcomes
(life expectancy) with low emissions per capita (Lamb et al., 2014), it’s
rare to find countries achieving good social outcomes across the board
with relatively low emissions (Lamb, 2016). Indeed, none do so while
remaining within planetary boundaries more broadly (O’Neill et al.,
2018).
The issue with top-down approaches, however, is they assume that
relationships between social outcomes and ecological impacts will re-
main broadly similar to those currently existing. Current socio-political
organisation, economic provisioning systems, and the highly unequal
wealth and income distributions that exist, all influence the efficiency
with which energy- and resource-use supports human well-being; in-
efficiencies in the system tend to become embedded within the con-
clusions of top-down modelling studies. Only rarely do studies look into
reducing social inefficiencies that stem from consumption that doesn’t
satisfy human needs, or even inhibits need satisfaction (Max-Neef,
1995; Lamb and Steinberger, 2017; Jackson and Marks, 1999). Far from
cultivating well-being, consumption is often driven by factors such as
private profit; intensive and locked-in social practices; employment-
related stress and poor mental health; conspicuous- or luxury-con-
sumption; or simply over-consumption in numerous forms (Gough,
2017).
Indeed, demand-side studies in general are rare (Creutzig et al.,
2018). In contrast, it is common for researchers to focus on the pro-
duction-side by analysing the ecological benefits of increasing techno-
logical efficiencies. Seemingly positive solutions are often found, but
technological trends are notoriously difficult to forecast. The emergence
of game-changing innovations are hard to predict and, crucially, may
work either for or against sustainability. For example, despite steady
improvements in engine efficiency, passenger aircraft in the 2000s were
only as efficient as those of the 1950s, due to the invention of jet en-
gines in the interim and their widespread substitution for propeller-
driven aircraft (Peeters et al., 2005).
Bottom-up approaches largely avoid these limitations. They work by
compiling consumption inventories that include all that considered
essential for humans’ to live good lives, and estimating the ecological
impacts of providing these. When building such models, the implicit
influence of current socio-political configurations can be minimised; if
one really wants to study, say, inequality or overconsumption, they
must be explicitly built in. The flip-side is that such models tend to-
wards underestimates. Essential goods or services are more likely to be
omitted than double counted, and the ecological impacts of supply
chains more likely to be truncated than incorrectly elongated (Fry et al.,
2018).
An early bottom-up estimate was made by Goldemberg et al. (1985).
They compiled an inventory of activities across residential (cooking,
food storage, etc.), commercial (floor space), transportation (private,
public and freight), manufacturing (steel, cement, etc.) and agricultural
(food) sectors. Together these were suggested to provide ‘basic needs
and much more’, for only 30 GJ/cap/yr of final energy consumption
annually. Most recently, Rao et al. (2019) estimated that 12–24 GJ/cap
of final energy consumption annually would be required to provide
decent material living standards in India, Brazil and South Africa. They
used a similar inventory to Goldemberg et al., but included modern
communication and information technologies, education, healthcare
and water provision (among other things) and, in addition, made robust
estimates of indirect energy use. Another recent estimate by Grubler
Table 1
. Inventory of the prerequisites for Decent Living Standards (DLS) (Rao and Min, 2018a) broken-down into key material requirements and services. The final column
indicates where we implement regional variations in the model, and gives a brief explanation; the Supplementary Materials give full details.
DLS dimension Material requirements and services Regional variation
Nutrition Food Consumption varies with countries’ age structures
Cooking appliances None implemented
Cold Storage None implemented
Shelter and living conditions Sufficient housing space None implemented
Thermal comfort Requirements vary with regional HDDs and CDDs
Illumination None implemented
Hygiene Water supply Intensity varies with water scarcity (higher scarcity → higher intensities)
Water heating Intensity varies with countries’ average temperatures
Waste management None implemented
Clothing Clothes None implemented
Washing facilities None implemented
Healthcare Hospitals None implemented
Education Schools Requirements vary with age structures (more young people → more schools)
Comms’ and information Phones Requirements vary with age structures (more children < 10yo → less phones)
Computers None implemented
Networks + data centres None implemented
Mobility Vehicle production Activity levels and mode shares vary with countries’ adjusted (‘lived’)
population densities (higher densities → lower activity levels)Vehicle’s propulsion
Transport infrastructure
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et al. (2018) offered values for a global Low-Energy Demand scenario,
which lie within the range of the above. Similar studies have looked
into carbon emissions (Mundaca et al., 2019; Akenji et al., 2019). By
taking a bottom-up approach here, our work builds upon the tradition
pioneered by Goldemberg et al.
2.3. Two types of energy
Our choice to consider final energy is novel but essential: final en-
ergy better reflects the energy requirements of society and economic
activity (Alessio et al., 2020). Primary energy assumes a portfolio of
existing energy sources, whose losses during conversion into final en-
ergy – e.g. coal into electricity, or oil into gasoline – are included in
total consumption. However, renewable energy sources like solar or
wind have no primary energy equivalent, and this means arbitrary as-
sumptions are often made when comparing them to fossil fuels. Such
misleading comparisons can leave fossil fuels appearing to outperform
renewables (Brockway et al., 2019). These issues are avoided by fo-
cusing on final energy.
However, a discussion of final and primary energy leads to another
important point, namely, that final energy is still a means to an end –
one stage in the energy cascade (Kalt et al., 2019). Final energy can
provide energy services – such as heating or mobility – which themselves
provide benefits – such as comfort and social participation. These ben-
efits may then satisfy different aspects of human well-being. Final en-
ergy is thus closer than primary energy to the services that can satisfy
basic needs.
This leads us to our last crucial point: In the results herein, if a
country’s current energy footprint is greater than what we estimate is
required for decent living standards, this does not imply that decent
living standards are being met throughout the population. How effi-
ciently each country’s current final energy use is being transformed into
energy services, how aligned these services are with benefits that satisfy
human needs, and how (un)equally benefits are distributed among
populations, are questions beyond the scope of our work – despite their
importance.
3. Methods and data
3.1. Approach
Our bottom-up modelling approach involves combining activity-
levels and associated energy intensities for each material requirement
or service, and then summing across all DLS dimensions to obtain es-
timates of total final energy consumption. Activity-levels are such
things as meters squared of housing per person, lumens of lighting per
household per day, kilograms of new clothing per person per year, litres
of hot water per person per day. By deriving energy intensities in the
same units, we can then perform simple upscaling to obtain energy use
for each DLS dimension. For example, we have the direct energy in-
tensity of heating and cooling, as well as for the embodied energy of
construction, both recorded in MJ/m2 of residential floor-space; these
can simply be multiplied by the m2/person activity-levels to obtain per
capita energy requirements.
Obtaining appropriate activity-levels and energy intensities requires
harvesting and assimilating a diversity of data, and we offer a high-level
summary of our values in Table 2. For energy intensities, we draw upon
a broad range of data from (among other things) life cycle assessment,
input–output analysis, industrial ecology and state-of-the-art en-
gineering work to derived values representative of the most efficient
technologies available. For activity-levels, we aim to determine what is
appropriate for sufficiency – what consumption is required for decent
living, but no more. Rao and Min (2018a) suggest first approximations
for each DLS category, but these aren’t intended to input directly into
an energy model – they aren’t always in quantitative form nor suitably
fine-grained when they are. We thus make various modifications and
add further details where necessary. For example, Rao and Min offer an
estimate of total mobility requirements per person (7000 km/year), but
we must disaggregate this into various modes of transport. They also
state requirements for healthcare and education in terms of minimum
expenditures and physicians and teachers per 1000 persons; from this,
we determine the floor-space of hospitals and schools each country
requires, then estimate the direct and embodied energy use of these
buildings and all related equipment and activities. An additional as-
sumption we make is that the average household size is four persons for
all countries; this feeds into calculations where activity levels are de-
fined relative to the number of households, e.g. our assumption of one
laptop per household.
For both activity-levels and energy intensities, we implement re-
gional variations where this is appropriate and we have data sufficient
to do so. For example, daily food-calorie requirements vary with age,
peaking in a person’s early twenties, so we make countries’ average per-
capita food requirements vary with age composition. Similarly, we
make educational floor-space requirements dependent upon the frac-
tion of a countries population that is 5–19 years of age (but note that
our energy intensities are not influenced by variations in activity-le-
vels). Other aspects of our modelling of regional-variation are parti-
cularly novel:
• For mobility, rather than using a fixed activity-level across all
countries, we make passenger kilometres/capita a function of ad-
justed population densities – national population densities scaled up
by considering what fraction of land is populated. These therefore
better represent the densities that people experience. Adjusted
densities also feed into our mode share calculations, which include
an (ambitious) combination of non-motorised transport, public
transport, and limited private vehicle use and air travel.• For thermal comfort, the amount of floor space per person is fixed
across all countries. For energy intensities, however, we integrate (i)
data describing direct energy requirements per unit floor space,
which vary with the number of cooling (CCD) and heating (HDD)
degree days experienced, with (ii) national, population-weighted
data for CCD and HDD, and forecasts of how these may vary under
future climate change. We do this for residential, healthcare and
public buildings.• For water supply, we begin with current energy intensities of water
supply infrastructure – the MJ required per litre supplied to
households – and estimate regional variability by considering cur-
rent water scarcity. We then use forecasts of climate change- and
population growth-induced water stress to estimate how these in-
tensities of water supply may change in different countries.
As mentioned, our aim is to consider the theoretical situation of
radically lowered demand and state-of-the-art technologies. Data for
the latter are derived from numerous sources, but they must sometimes
be modified to be consistent with activity-levels. For example, for the
energy intensity of private transport, we begin with energy intensities
for highly advanced vehicles, based on what Cullen et al. (2011) suggest
is practically achievable in the long-term. Then, however, we slightly
retreat upon these assumptions to allow for the larger vehicles needed
to achieve the high occupancy rates we assume. Note, ‘achievable’ here
refers to engineering considerations – we say nothing of the afford-
ability of such technologies and, within the current economic paradigm,
there are serious barriers that would require major technological
transfer programmes from the Global North (among numerous other
things). Further, the unjust distributional impacts that accompany the
rollout of high-tech, ecological solutions are well known. For example,
hybrid cars and rooftop solar technologies are typically only accessible
to wealthier citizens, who are thus the ones that benefit from any as-
sociated tax breaks and subsidies.
When presenting the results, we show for comparison recently
published estimates of final energy consumption in 2011 derived from
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the input–output data of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), for
119 countries (Oswald et al., 2020). This gives an indication of current
energy use as compared to the minimum our model suggests is possible
while still providing decent living, but the disclaimer given in Section
2.3 must again be noted.
3.2. Infrastructure timescales
How we incorporate long-term infrastructure requires clarification.
Our assumption of state-of-the-art technologies raises the question of
how to account for currently built infrastructures that have lifetimes
extending beyond 2050, and when such infrastructures should be re-
placed prematurely by more efficient ones. Housing is a salient ex-
ample. Much current housing has a lifetime beyond 2050, so retrofitting
is more likely than replacement with advanced new buildings, despite
the latter having lower direct-energy requirements. However, esti-
mating what fraction of housing in each country would be more ap-
propriate to retrofit than rebuild would be an enormous task; this would
require estimating the remaining lifetimes of buildings and applying a
time-threshold to this to determine when, from a full lifecycle per-
spective, retrofitting is most appropriate, and forecasting all of this for
2050. We thus assume the global housing stock is fully replaced via a
worldwide deployment of advanced new buildings with very low
heating and cooling energy requirements – and we make the same as-
sumption for other buildings (educational, healthcare and commercial).
This implies that a significant amount of infrastructure is replaced
prematurely, which could be considered unrealistic. However, we ac-
count for all the energy embodied in these new infrastructures,
distributing it over buildings’ lifetimes (note also that we account for
energy relating to lighting and appliances separately). And we show
below that had we assumed advanced retrofits instead the results would
change only negligibly. Our results thus offer a steady-state picture of
future energy-consumption for 2050 in a world where advanced tech-
nologies are fully deployed and replaced when necessary. There re-
mains a valid concern that if the entire global building stock were
somehow replaced over a period of two or three years, there would be a
huge spike in energy use and carbon emissions. However, these tem-
poral dynamics are beyond our current scope.
To demonstrate the difference between new and retrofit housing, a
back-of-the-envelope calculation is insightful. With full deployment of
advanced buildings, we calculate global annual energy use for thermal
comfort in residential buildings to be ~5 EJ; equal to the indirect en-
ergy used in their construction. Data from GBPN (2012) suggests that
direct energy use for thermal comfort in advanced retrofit buildings is
~40% higher than in the advanced new buildings we assume. Retro-
fitting would thus lead to a ~2 EJ increase in direct energy annually,
but if it also reduced indirect energy use in construction by, say, 80%,
this would mean ~4 EJ less indirect energy – a net decrease of ~2 EJ.
This equates to< 2% reduction in total global energy use, implying
that the effects of assuming advanced new builds rather than advanced
retrofits is negligible.
3.3. Scenarios
We are most interested in our lowest energy-consumption scenario
(Decent Living Energy; DLE), but also consider three others: one with
Table 2
. Inventory of the prerequisites for Decent Living Standards (DLS) (Rao and Min, 2018a) alongside activity levels and direct and indirect energy intensities of products,
supply chains and infrastructure. Numbers are rounded and presented as ranges where there are variations between countries or sub-activities (e.g. different transport
modes). Approximate percentage increases for Higher Demand (HD) and Less Advanced Technology (LAT) scenarios are included where possible, but these cannot
always be summarised in this high-level format. Full details can be found in the Supplementary materials.
DLS dimensions & services Activity levels Energy Intensities
Default levels HD Default (direct) Default (indirect) LAT
Nutrition
Food 2000–2150 kcal/cap/day 15% – 3 KJ/kilocalorie 30%
Cooking appliances 1 cooker/household – 0.8 KJ/kilocalorie 1 GJ/app+ 50%
Cold Storage 1 fridge-freezer/household – 0.44 GJ/app+/yr 4 GJ/app+ –
Shelter & living conditions
Household size 4 persons/household −25% – – –
Sufficient space 15 meters2 floor-space/cap* 80% – 2–4 GJ/m2 100%
Thermal comfort 15 meters2 floor-space/cap* 80% 20–60 MJ/m2/yr – 300%
Illumination 2500 lm/house; 6 hrs/day 100% 150 lm/W 14 MJ/house/yr –
Hygiene
Water supply 50 Litres/cap/day 100% – 5–17 KJ/L –
Water heating 20 Litres/cap/day 100% 96–220 KJ/L – 50%
Waste management Provided to all households** – – 180 MJ/cap/yr 200%
Clothing
Clothes 4 kg of new clothing/year 33% – 100 MJ/kg –
W ashing facilities 80 kg of washing/year 33% 2.4 MJ/kg 2 GJ/app+ –
Healthcare Hospitals 200 meters2 floor-space/bed 50% 410–560 MJ/m2/yr 14–23 GJ/m2 130%
Education Schools 10 meters2 floor-space/pupil 50% 100–130 MJ/m2/yr 4.5–7.5 GJ/m2 150%
Communication & information
Phones 1 phone/person over 10yrs old – 28 MJ/phone/yr 110 MJ/phone 30%
Computers 1 laptop/household – 220 MJ/laptop/yr 3 GJ/laptop 30%
Networks & data High** 100% – ~0.4 GJ/cap/yr –
Mobility
Vehicle production Consistent with pkm travelled** – – 0.1–0.3 MJ/pkm 50%
Vehicle propulsion 5000–15,000 pkm/cap/year 3–10% 0.2–1.9 MJ/pkm++ – 100%
Infrastructure Consistent with pkm travelled** – – 0.1–0.3 MJ/pkm –
* Assuming 10 m2 of living space/capita plus 20 m2 of communal space/house; with the latter divided by four, we get 15 m2/capita overall.
** Activity levels here are not straightforward to define.
+ ’App’ refers to ‘appliance’.
++ Large range as this covers different modes (public transport to passenger flights).
J. Millward-Hopkins, et al. Global Environmental Change 65 (2020) 102168
5
increased (but still relatively low) demand (Higher Demand; HD), one
without the same technological ambition (Less Advanced Technology;
LAT) and one with these rolled-back assumptions combined (HD-LAT).
Our wording here is chosen carefully: all of these scenarios, HD-LAT
included, can be considered to be ambitious.
An indication of the percentage increases in activity-levels and en-
ergy intensities across DLS dimensions in the scenarios is given in
Table 2, but it should be emphasised that these are only indicative, as
the changes are not readily summarised at this high-level. For example,
one aspect of the HD scenario is a decrease in average household size
(from 4 to 3 people), which has impacts across numerous consumption
sectors – appliance and computer ownership levels, residential floor
area and hence energy related to thermal comfort, lighting and con-
struction. In other cases, the model is changed at a relatively low level
in multiple ways, which combine to affect one DLS aspect. For example,
in the HD scenario, we increase the consumption of animal products
and the quantity of food waste generated, which together modify the
energy input per kilocalorie of food consumed. Full details are given in
the Supplementary Materials.
4. Results
4.1. Global energy use for decent living
When we compare current final energy consumption across the 119
GTAP countries with our estimates of final energy for decent living
(DLE), we find the vast majority (~100) of countries are living in sur-
plus (Fig. 1). Those living in deficit all have a GDP/cap less than $6000
PPP. The range of DLE thresholds is small at 13–18.4 GJ/cap/yr of final
energy consumption across all 119 countries, while current consump-
tion ranges from under 5 GJ/cap/yr to over 200 GJ/cap/yr – a level of
inequality that mirrors environmental pressures more broadly (Teixido-
Figueras et al., 2016). Current consumption increases with GDP, while
DLE (unsurprisingly) bears no relationship – it’s instead determined by
climatic and demographic factors (heating & cooling degree days, age
profiles, living densities, etc). More specifically, regional variations in
activity levels (mostly mobility levels) and energy intensities (mostly
thermal comfort and water heating in residential buildings) make
roughly equal contributions to the overall range of our DLE values.
Where GDP/cap>$15,000, current energy consumption is ~2 to ~15
times larger than DLE. However, note again that this doesn’t imply
decent living standards in these places are currently being provided to
everyone.
In comparison to other studies estimating future final energy de-
mand, our DLE estimates are remarkably low, with global final energy
consumption at 149 EJ in 2050 (Fig. 2; or 15.3 GJ/cap/yr). This is over
60% lower than current consumption (despite the 2050 population
being ~30% larger than the present day); 75% below the International
Energy Agency’s 2050 Stated Policies estimate – the expected trajectory if
todays’ commitments are met and maintained – and 60% below their
most ambitious Sustainable Development Scenario (IEA, 2019b); and
around 40% lower than 2050 consumption in the Low Energy Demand
scenario of Grubler et al. (2018) (245 EJ).
Note, however, that none of these studies attempt – as we do – to
minimise energy-use without sacrificing decent living. In the IEA’s
Sustainable Development Scenario, for example, the focus is on fulfilling
the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals by increasing things
like electricity access and availability of clean cooking stoves to 100%,
globally; this effectively puts a floor on consumption, but the IEA do not
consider capping the energy use of the wealthiest global consumers.
This is a primary reason for their 2050 SDS final energy consumption
being douple ours – and, incidentally, it leaves the 10th Sustainable
Development Goal of reducing inequality unchecked.
4.2. Energy use by decent living-sector
Globally, the major contributors to DLE are nutrition and mobility at
~3 GJ/cap/yr each (Fig. 3). Nutrition itself is mostly comprised of food
production and supply (we don’t include the energy contained in food
itself), with only 0.5 GJ/cap/yr involved in cooking and cold storage.
For mobility-related energy use, 70% is for manufacturing and pow-
ering vehicles, with the remaining 30% used for producing transport
networks’ infrastructure (e.g. railways, roads). Shelter & living condi-
tions, healthcare and hygiene make contributions of ~1.5 GJ/cap/yr
each, globally. For the former, the contributions of constructing houses
and thermal comfort are roughly equal, while energy used for lighting is
Fig. 1. . Final energy consumption for 119 countries
in the GTAP database calculated using input–output
analysis, for 2011. For the same countries, decent
living energy estimates are shown. Visually, there is
little variation: DLE estimates all lie within the
narrow green band, where the dark line is the global
mean. Note the logarithmic scaling on the x-axis
only. (For interpretation of the references to colour
in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the
web version of this article.)
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comparatively negligible. Healthcare includes construction of, and ser-
vices provided by, hospitals, along with broader activities like medi-
cations and emergency transport. For hygiene, household water heating
dominates, accounting for 1 GJ/cap/yr, with the remaining 0.5 GJ/
cap/yr split equally between household water supply and waste man-
agement (i.e. all the energy used by these sectors, including construc-
tion of infrastructure). The energy use associated with clothing (both
production and washing of clothes), education (construction of and
energy used by schools) and communication & information (phones,
laptops and the infrastructure requires for networks and data centre
operations) together comes to a global average of nearly 2 GJ/cap/yr.
The remaining 3 GJ/cap/yr (shown as other) is associated with power
supply infrastructure and retail and freight activities, which have not
been allocated to consumption categories.
Sector-breakdowns of DLE are also shown for Rwanda, where the
regional specificity of our model estimates low mobility and thermal-
comfort requirements; Uruguay, where mobility requirements are high
and thermal comfort requirements average; and Kyrgyzstan, where
both mobility and thermal comfort requirements are high. Accordingly,
the DLE threshold for Rwanda is estimated to be 13.5 GJ/cap/yr, with
Uruguay at 16 GJ/cap/yr and Kyrgyzstan at 18.4 GJ/cap/yr. Inter-
country variations are found in various other categories besides mobi-
lity and thermal comfort, due to factors like population age structures,
which affects educational requirements and food-intakes; the assumed
availability of low-energy building materials (i.e. timber as an alter-
native to steel); and the energy-intensity of water supply, which we
assume depends upon scarcity (or abundance) of local supply. However,
the influence of these factors is generally small or negligible overall.
Fig. 2. . Global final energy consumption, including: historical data and projections from the IEA’s Current Policies, Stated Policies and Sustainable Development (SDS)
scenarios; the Low Energy Demand estimate of Grubler et al. for 2050; and the current DLE estimate for 2050.
Fig. 3. . Decent living energy per capita (in
final energy), broken down into consump-
tion categories and subcategories detailed in
Table 1. Our global average is shown
alongside data for Rwanda, Uruguay and
Kyrgyzstan. Dashed lines indicating our
global mean, minimum and maximum are
also shown (15.3, 13.0, and 18.4 GJ/cap/yr,
respectively).
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4.3. Higher energy-use scenarios
Finally, we consider the impacts of rolling-back the ambitions as-
sumed in calculating our DLE thresholds (Fig. 4) to levels that are still
relatively ambitious, but less so than the DLE case. In the Higher Demand
scenario, energy use jumps 40% – from ~15 GJ/cap to ~24 GJ/cap –
due to relaxation of various DLE assumptions. These include, among
other things, a decrease in average household size (from 4 to 3); in-
creased consumption of water and animal-based foods; more food
waste; greater floor-space per capita in all building types; increased
flying as well as a shift in mobility away from public and active
transport towards private vehicles; decreased clothing lifetimes; and
increased ICT network activity. The consumption-sector undergoing the
largest increase is nutrition, due largely to both increased waste and
consumption of animal-products (despite the latter still con-
tributing<20% to food intake on a kcal basis). In relative terms, the
energy use associated with all other categories also increases sig-
nificantly, normally by 50–100%, although the increases in mobility-
related energy are slightly lower, at ~30%.
In the Less Advanced Technology scenario, globally-averaged energy
use rises a similar amount above the DLE case, this time to 26 GJ/cap
(Fig. 4). This is due to our increasing energy intensities in various parts
of the model, e.g., for both in-use and construction-related energy for
all types of buildings; household water-heating systems; food supply
chains and processing facilities; vehicles’ direct energy use and that
required for production of vehicles and transport infrastructure; and for
the energy intensity of producing renewable energy infrastructure. The
sectors contributing the most to this rise above DLE levels are mobility,
residential buildings and healthcare. Rises in other sectors are less
significant in absolute terms.
When the assumptions of the HD and LAT scenarios are applied
together in a single model run (HD-LAT), globally-averaged energy use
rises to ~40 GJ/cap, thus exceeding the 32 GJ/cap calculated by
Goldemberg et al. (1985). However, even this rolled-back scenario
gives just under 400 EJ of final energy use globally in 2050 – equal to
the IEA’s Sustainable Development Scenario (Fig. 2).
Note that the results of these scenarios are similar to those in the
sensitivity test we present in the Supplementary Materials. There,
perturbing our activity-level assumptions – by increasing residential
and public buildings’ floor space (by 100% and 50%, respectively),
consumption of animal products, and overall mobility levels (by 50%)
while decreasing the share of public transport, etc. – leaves DLE at
around the same level as the HD scenario. Similarly, perturbing our
intensity assumptions raises DLE to a similar level as the LAT scenario.
We refer the reader to the Supplementary Materials for information
upon the sensitivity to individual parameters.
5. Discussion and conclusions
What can be made from these results? First, we can reiterate what
has been suggested by countless other authors: high-quality, low-energy
housing, widespread public transport, and diets low in animal-based
foods are globally important issues for sustainability ambitions. In other
words, demand-side solutions are an essential part of staying within
planetary boundaries (Creutzig et al., 2018). However, the perspective
of the current work is a global, big-picture one, and it focuses ex-
clusively on final energy consumption. The results are thus of limited
use for guiding specific local and national actions to reduce ecological
impacts effectively and holistically. Consequently, further work ap-
plying bottom-up modelling to specific local contexts – following Rao
et al. (2019) – would be valuable. To suggest where consumption can be
reduced most effectively, it would then be useful to take current energy
consumption data and distinguish so far as is possible luxury, wasteful,
and sufficiency based consumption (Gough, 2017; Shue, 1993) – dis-
aggregating the latter to needs-based consumption categories, and
considering trade-offs and synergies between dimensions of social and
ecological sustainability.
What the current work does offer are answers to broader questions.
To avoid catastrophic ecological collapse, it is clear that drastic and
challenging societal transformations must occur at all levels, from the
individual to institutional, and from supply through to demand. From
an energy-use perspective, the current work suggests that meeting these
challenges does not, in theory, preclude extending decent living stan-
dards, universally, to a population of ~10 billion. Decent living is of
course a subjective concept in public discourse. However, the current
work offers a response to the clichéd populist objection that en-
vironmentalists are proposing that we return to living in caves. With
tongue firmly in cheek, the response roughly goes ‘Yes, perhaps, but
these caves have highly-efficient facilities for cooking, storing food and
washing clothes; low-energy lighting throughout; 50 L of clean water
supplied per day per person, with 15 L heated to a comfortable bathing
temperature; they maintain an air temperature of around 20 °C
throughout the year, irrespective of geography; have a computer with
access to global ICT networks; are linked to extensive transport net-
works providing ~5000–15,000 km of mobility per person each year
via various modes; and are also served by substantially larger caves
Fig. 4. . Globally averaged decent living
energy per capita in 2050 and three sce-
narios with rolled-back ambition, i.e.
higher demand (HD), less advanced tech-
nologies (LAT), and higher demand and less
advanced technologies together (HD-LAT).
Thresholds for energy use from other sce-
narios are also shown, as described in the
text. Note, SA = South Africa.
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where universal healthcare is available and others that provide edu-
cation for everyone between 5 and 19 years old.’ And at the same time,
it is possible that the amount of people’s lives that must be spent
working would be substantially reduced.
However, the current work has entirely avoided the most difficult
question: how could we get from the current global situation of vast
inequalities, excess and inefficient energy-use to one where decent
living standards are provided universally and efficiently (Pirgmaier,
2020)? The current work has little to say here in the way of specifics,
but there are some things that can be said with more certainty. Al-
though technological progress and individual-level change are essential
parts of a solution to ecological breakdown, incrementalist propositions
along the lines of green growth and green consumerism are inadequate
(Bailey et al., 2011; WEBB, 2012). The ideals of sufficiency, material
thresholds and economic equality that underpin the current modelling
are incompatible with the economic norms of the present, where un-
employment and vast inequalities are systematic requirements, waste is
often considered economically efficient (due to brand-protection,
planned obsolescence, etc.) and the indefinite pursuit of economic
growth is necessary for political and economic stability.
The challenges of changing this trajectory shouldn’t be understated
(Semieniuk and Yakovenko, 2020). In the Global North, the trends to-
wards sufficiency-levels of consumption that exist – such as Transition
Towns and the minimalism movement – are notoriously middle class and
white, and are the exception rather than the norm (Aiken, 2012). In the
Global South, consumption of the upper-classes has leapt well beyond
sufficiency levels, while hundreds of millions remain left in poverty.
This leaves crucial questions for future researchers to address: What
sort of political-economy could create a world with both low
throughput and high livings standards and the levels of equality that
achieving these requires? What sort of culture would accept and sup-
port the necessary policies and institutions? Where, from the in-
dividual- to institutional-level, are potential leverage points for moving
towards such changes (Pirgmaier, 2020; Brand-Correa et al., 2020)?
All this is not to mention that provision of the material living
standards we have considered does not guarantee that every person will
live a good life. Many other factors can adversely and unavoidably af-
fect physical and mental health; as philosophers have pointed out for
millennia – back to the Buddha and beyond – even when material living
standards are high, human well-being can be elusive.
To finish more positively, however, a comparison of our estimate of
the energy required for decent living with projections of the energy
supplied by non-fossil sources offers grounds for optimism. Currently,
only 17% of global final energy consumption is from non-fossil fuel
sources (IEA, 2019a). But in absolute terms this is nearly 70 EJ, and
hence nearly 50% of our DLE estimate for 2050 of 149 EJ. Indeed, by
2050, even in the IEA’s Stated Policies scenario, ~130 EJ of final energy
is provided by non-fossil-based sources – very close to the DLE re-
quirement of 149 EJ. That non-fossil energy sources could meet our DLE
requirements, even under business-as-usual, is highly significant.
Overall then, the present work is consistent with long-standing ar-
guments that the economic and socio-political changes necessary to
address the magnitude of present ecological challenges are enormous,
while the technological solutions already exist. What we add is that the
material sacrifices are, in theory, far smaller than many popular nar-
ratives imply. And quite the opposite is true for the ~4 billion currently
living in poverty (that is, on less than $7.40 PPP per day), for whom life
could, conceivably, be substantially improved.
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